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Abstract. We introduce games with probabilistic uncertainty, a natural model for controller synthesis in which
the controller observes the state of the system through imprecise sensors that provide correct information about
the current state with a fixed probability. That is, in each step, the sensors return an observed state, and given the
observed state, there is a probability distribution (due to the estimation error) over the actual current state. The
controller must base its decision on the observed state (rather than the actual current state, which it does not know).
On the other hand, we assume that the environment can perfectly observe the current state. We show that our
model can be reduced in polynomial time to standard partial-observation stochastic games, and vice-versa. As a
consequence we establish the precise decidability frontier for the new class of games, and for most of the decidable
problems establish optimal complexity results.
1 Introduction
In a control system, a controller interacts with its environment through sensors and actuators. The controller observes
the state of the environment through a set of sensors, computes a control signal that depends on the history of observed
sensor readings, and feeds the control signal to the environment through actuators. The state of the environment is
then updated as a function of the control signal as well as a disturbance signal that models external inputs to the
environment. In a reactive setting, the sense-compute-actuate cycle repeats forever, resulting in an infinite trace of
environment states. The objective of the controller is to ensure that the trace belongs to a given specification of “good”
traces. The controller synthesis problem asks, given the dynamical law that specifies how the environment state changes
according to the controller inputs and external disturbances, and a specification of good traces, to synthesize a control
law that ensures that the environment traces are good, no matter how external disturbances behave.
Controller synthesis has been studied extensively for deterministic games with ω-regular specifications [5,14,13].
In this setting, the problem is modeled as a game on a graph. The vertices of the graph represent system states, and
are divided into “controller states” and “disturbance states.” At a controller state, the controller chooses an outgoing
edge and moves to a neighboring vertex along this edge. At a disturbance state, the disturbance chooses an outgoing
edge and moves along this edge. This continues ad infinitum, defining a sequence of states. If this sequence satisfies
the specification, the controller wins; otherwise, the disturbance wins. The games are called perfect observation, since
both players have exact knowledge of the current state and the history of the game.
The study of perfect-observation deterministic games have been extended to systems with partial observation, in
which the controller can only observe part of the environment’s state [15,7], and to stochastic dynamics [12,8,10,11],
in which the state updates happen according to a probabilistic law.
The “standard model” of partial-observation stochastic games [7,3,2] is described as an extension to the above
graph model, by fixing an equivalence relation on the vertices (the “observation function”), and stipulating that the
controller only sees the equivalence class of the current vertex, not the particular vertex the state is in. In addition, the
transitions of the graph are stochastic: the controller and the disturbance each choose some move, and the next vertex
is chosen according to a probability distribution based on the current vertex and the chosen move.
In this paper, we introduce a different, albeit natural, model of probabilistic uncertainty in controller synthesis.
Consider a state given by n bits. The sensors used to measure the state are typically not perfect, and observing the state
through the sensor results in some bits being flipped with some known probability (probabilistic noise). In applica-
tions where the controller observes the state bits through a network, then the probabilistic noise in the communication
channels results in bits being flipped with some known probability (according to the classical Shannon’s communica-
tion channel model). Thus, the controller observes n bits through the sensor, and this estimate defines a probability
distribution over the state space for the current state. In contrast, we allow the disturbance to precisely observe the
state, corresponding to a worst case assumption on the disturbance. The objective of the controller is to find a strategy
that ensures that the system satisfies the specification under this probabilistic uncertainty on the current state. We dis-
tinguish between two models of the disturbance. In the first model, the disturbance observes the correct sequence of
states as well as both the observation of the controller and the sequence of controller moves. In the second model, the
disturbance observes the correct sequence of states as well as the sequence of controller moves (but not the observation
of the controller). It turns out that the two models give rise to subtle differences in defining the probability measures
on the games, as well as different complexities in the solution algorithms.
Our model (which we refer to as games with probabilistic uncertainty) is inspired by analogous models of state
estimation under probabilistic noise in continuous control systems. We believe this model of games with probabilistic
uncertainty naturally captures the behavior of many sensor-based control systems. Intuitively, the standard model
of partial-observation games represent “partial but correct information” where the controller can observe correctly
only the first k < n bits of the state (i.e., the observation is partial as the controller observes only a part of the
state bits, but the information about the observed state bits is always correct). In contrast, our model of games with
probabilistic uncertainty represent “complete but uncertain information” where the controller can observe all the n bits
of the state but with uncertainty of observation (i.e., the controller can observe all the bits, but each bit is correct with
some probability). Since the type of uncertain information in our model is very different from the standard models of
partial-observation games studied in the literature, the relationship between them is not immediate.
Our main contribution, along with the introduction of the natural model of games with probabilistic uncertainty, is
establishing the equivalence of the new class of games and partial-observation games. Our main technical result is a
polynomial-time reduction from this new model of games with probabilistic uncertainty to standard partial-observation
games, and a converse reduction from partially-observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) to games with
probabilistic uncertainty. The results to establish the equivalence of the two classes of games which represent two
different notions of information (partial but correct vs complete but uncertain) are quite intricate. For example, for the
new class of games the inductive definition of probability measure is subtle and different from the classical definition
of probability measure for probabilistic systems [17,9]. This is because the controller observes a history that can be
completely different from the actual history, whereas the environment (or disturbance) observes the actual history.
We first inductively define a probability measure of observed history, given the actual history, and use it to define the
probability measure inductively. We show how our polynomial constructions for reduction capture the subtleties in the
probability measure, and by establishing precise mapping of strategies (which is at the heart of the proof of correctness
of the reduction) we obtain the desired equivalence result.
In the positive direction, our reduction allows us to solve controller synthesis problems for games with proba-
bilistic uncertainty against ω-regular specifications, using algorithms of [7,2]. In the negative direction, we get lower
bounds on the hardness of problems by using known lower bounds for POMDPs using the hardness results of [1,6].
In particular, with our reductions we establish precisely the decidability frontier of games with probabilistic uncer-
tainty for various classes of parity objectives (a canonical form to express ω-regular specifications); and for most of
the decidable problems we establish EXPTIME-complete bounds, and in some cases 2EXPTIME upper bounds and
EXPTIME lower bounds (see Table 1). Moreover, our reduction allows the rich body of algorithms (such as symbolic
and anti-chain based algorithms [7,2]) for partial-observation games, along with any future algorithmic developments
for partial-observation games, to be applicable to solve games with probabilistic uncertainty. In summary, our results
provide precise decidability frontier, optimal complexity (in most cases), and algorithmic solutions for games with
probabilistic uncertainty, that is a natural model for control problems with state estimation under probabilistic noise.
2 Games with Probabilistic Uncertainty
In this section we introduce a class of games with probabilistic imperfect information, and call them games with
probabilistic uncertainty.
Probability distribution. A probability distribution on a finite setA is a function κ : A→ [0, 1] such that
∑
a∈A κ(a) =
1. We denote by D(A) the set of probability distributions on A.
Game structures with probabilistic uncertainty. A game structure with probabilistic uncertainty consists of a tuple
G = (L,ΣI , ΣO, ∆, un), where (a) L is a set of locations; (b) ΣI and ΣO are two sets of input and output alphabets,
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respectively; (c) ∆ : L × ΣI × ΣO → D(L) is a probabilistic transition function that given a location, an input and
an output letter gives the probability distribution over the next locations; and (d) un : L → D(L) is the probabilistic
uncertainty function that given the true current location describes the probability distribution of the observed location.
If un is the identity function we obtain perfect-observation games.
Intuitively, a game proceeds as follows. The game starts at some location ℓ ∈ L. Player 1 observes a state drawn
from the distribution un(ℓ), which represents a potentially faulty observation process. Intuitively, at every step the
player can observe the value of all variables that corresponds to the state of the game, but there is a probability that
the observed value of some variables is incorrect. Player 2 observes the “correct” state ℓ. Given the observation of the
history of the game so far, Player 1 picks an input alphabet σi ∈ Σi. Player 2 then picks an output letter σo ∈ Σo:
we consider two variants, (1) Player 2 only observes the history of correct locations and the moves of the players;
and (2) Player 2 observes the history of correct locations, the moves of the players, and also observes the history of
observed locations of Player 1. The state of the game is updated to ℓ′ with probability ∆(ℓ, σi, σo)(ℓ′). This process is
repeated ad infinitum.
Plays. A play of G is a sequence ρ = ℓ0σi0σo0ℓ1σi1σo1 . . . of locations, input letter, and output letter, such that for all
j ≥ 0we have∆(ℓj , σij , σoj )(ℓj+1) > 0. The prefix up to ℓn of the play ρ is denoted by ρ(n), its length is |ρ(n)| = n+1
and its last element is Last(ρ(n)) = ℓn. The set of plays in G is denoted by Plays(G), and the set of corresponding
finite prefixes is denoted Prefs(G).
Strategies. A strategy for Player 1 observes the finite prefix of a play and then selects an input letter (pure strategies) or a
probability distribution over input letters in Σi. Formally, a pure strategy for Player 1 is a function α : Prefs(G) → Σi,
and a randomized strategy for Player 1 is a function α : Prefs(G) → D(Σi). Similarly, pure and randomized strategies
for Player 2 are defined as functions β : Prefs(G) × Σi → Σo and β : Prefs(G) × Σi → D(Σo), respectively. Note
that Player 2 sees Player 1’s choice of input action at each step. In the case where Player 2 observes also the history of
observed locations, the pure and randomized strategies are defined as functions β : Prefs(G) × Prefs(G) ×Σi → Σo
and β : Prefs(G) × Prefs(G) × Σi → D(Σo), respectively, where the output letter is chosen based on the original
history and observed history. We refer to strategies that observes both histories as “all-powerful” strategies for Player 2.
Outcomes. The outcome of two randomized strategies α for Player 1 and β for Player 2 from a location ℓ ∈ L is
the set of plays ρ = ℓ0σi0σo0 . . . such that (1) ℓ = ℓ0, (2) there exists a sequence ℓ′0ℓ′1 . . . such that un(ℓj)(ℓ′j) > 0
for each j ≥ 0, (3) for each j ≥ 0, we have α(ℓ′0σi0σo0 . . . ℓ′j)(σij) > 0 and β(ρ(j), σij)(σoj ) > 0 (if β is an all-
powerful strategy, then β(ρ(j), ℓ′0σi0σo0ℓ′1 . . . ℓ′j , σij)(σoj ) > 0), and ∆(ℓj , σij , σoj )(ℓj+1) > 0. The primed sequence
ℓ′0ℓ
′
1 . . . gives the sequence of observations made by Player 1 using the probabilistic uncertainty function. Note that
this sequence may be incorrect with some probability due to probabilistic uncertainty in the observation. We denote
this set of plays as Outcome(G, ℓ, α, β). The outcome of two pure strategies is defined analogously, considering pure
strategies as degenerate randomized strategies which pick a letter with probability one. The outcome set of the pure
(resp. randomized) strategy α for Player 1 in G is the set Outcome1(G, ℓ, α) of plays ρ such that there exists a pure
(resp. randomized) strategy β for Player 2 with ρ ∈ Outcome(G, ℓ, α, β). The outcome set Outcome2(G, ℓ, β) for
Player 2 is defined symmetrically.
Probability measure. Given strategies α and β, we define the probability measure Prα,βℓ0 (·). The definition of the
probability measure is subtle and non-standard as the prefix that Player 1 observes can be completely different from
the original history. For a finite prefix ρ ∈ Prefs(G), let Cone(ρ) denote the set of plays with ρ as prefix. We will define
Prα,βℓ0 (·) for cones, and then by Caratheodory extension theorem [4] there is a unique extension to all measurable sets
of paths. To define the probability measure we also need to define a function ObsSeq(ρ), that given a finite prefix ρ,
gives the probability distribution over finite prefixes ρ′, such that ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ′) denotes the probability of observing
ρ′ given the correct prefix is ρ. The base case is as follows:
Prα,βℓ0 (Cone(ℓ0)) = 1; ObsSeq(ℓ0)(ℓ
′) = un(ℓ0)(ℓ
′).
The inductive definition of ObsSeq is as follows: for a prefix ρ of length n+ 1
ObsSeq(ρσinσ
o
nℓn+1)(ρ
′σinσ
o
nℓ
′
n+1) = ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ
′) · un(ℓn+1)(ℓ
′
n+1)
Given a sequence ρ = ℓ0σi0σo0ℓ1σi1σo1 . . . ℓn, we define ActMt(ρ) = {ρ˜ = ℓ˜0σ˜i0σ˜o0ℓ1σ˜i1σ˜o1 . . . ℓ˜n | ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n −
1. σ˜ij = σ
i
j and σ˜oj = σoj } the sequences of same length as ρ such that the sequence of input and output letter matches
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(i.e., the set of action-matching prefixes). Note that for non action-matching prefixes the observation sequence function
always assigns probability zero. The inductive case for the probability measure is as follows: for a prefix ρ of length
n+ 1 with last state ℓn, we have
Prα,βℓ0 (Cone(ρσ
i
nσ
o
nℓn+1)) =
Prα,βℓ0 (Cone(ρ)) ·
( ∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρ)
ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ′) · α(ρ′)(σin) · β(ρσ
i
n)(σ
o
n) ·∆(ℓn, σ
i
n, σ
o
n)(ℓn+1)
)
;
i.e., ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ′) gives the probability to observe ρ′, then α(ρ′)(σin) denotes the probability to play σin given the
strategy and observed sequence ρ′, and since Player 2 observes the correct sequence the probability to play σon is given
by β(ρσin)(σon) (Player 2 observes ρ), and the final term ∆(ℓn, σin, σon)(ℓn+1) gives the transition probability. If β is
an all-powerful strategy, then β observes both the correct history ρ and the observed history ρ′, and then the definition
is as follows:
Prα,βℓ0 (Cone(ρσ
i
nσ
0
nℓn+1)) =
Prα,βℓ0 (Cone(ρ)) ·
( ∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρ)
ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ′) · α(ρ′)(σin) · β(ρ, ρ
′, σin)(σ
o
n) ·∆(ℓn, σ
i
n, σ
o
n)(ℓn+1)
)
.
Winning objectives. An objective for Player 1 in G is a set φ ⊆ Plays(G) of plays. A play ρ ∈ Plays(G) satisfies the
objective φ, denoted ρ |= φ, if ρ ∈ φ. We consider ω-regular objectives specified as parity objectives (a canonical form
to express all ω-regular objectives [16]). For a play ρ = ℓ0σi0σo0 . . ., we denote by ρk the k-th location ℓk of the play
and denote by Inf(ρ) the set of locations that occur infinitely often in ρ, that is, Inf(ρ) = {ℓ | ∀i∃j : j > i and ℓj = ℓ}.
We consider the following classes of objectives.
1. Reachability and safety objectives. Given a set T ⊆ L of target locations, the reachability objective Reach(T )
requires that a location in T be visited at least once, that is, Reach(T ) = {ρ | ∃k ≥ 0 · ρk ∈ T }. Dually, the
safety objective Safe(T ) requires that only states in T be visited. Formally, Safe(T ) = {ρ | ∀k ≥ 0 · ρk ∈ T }.
2. Bu¨chi and coBu¨chi objectives. Let T ⊆ L be a set of target locations. The Bu¨chi objective Buchi(T ) requires that
a state in T be visited infinitely often, that is, Buchi(T ) = {ρ | Inf(ρ) ∩ T 6= ∅}. Dually, the coBu¨chi objective
coBuchi(T ) requires that only states in T be visited infinitely often. Formally, coBuchi(T ) = {ρ | Inf(ρ) ⊆ T }.
3. Parity objectives. For d ∈ N, let p : L→ {0, 1, . . . , d} be a priority function, which maps each state to a nonneg-
ative integer priority. The parity objective Parity(p) requires that the minimum priority that occurs infinitely often
be even. Formally, Parity(p) = {ρ | min{p(ℓ) | ℓ ∈ Inf(ρ)} is even}. The Bu¨chi and coBu¨chi objectives are the
special cases of parity objectives with two priorities, p : L→ {0, 1} and p : L→ {1, 2}, respectively.
Sure, almost-sure and positive winning. An event is a measurable set of plays, and given strategies α and β for the
two players, the probabilities of events are uniquely defined. For an objective φ, assumed to be Borel, we denote by
Prα,βℓ (φ) the probability that φ is satisfied by the play obtained from the starting location ℓ when the strategies α and β
are used. Given a game G, an objective φ, and a location ℓ, we consider the following winning modes: (1) a strategy α
for Player 1 is sure winning for the objective φ from ℓ ∈ L if Outcome(G, ℓ, α, β) ⊆ φ for all strategies β for Player 2;
(2) a strategy α for Player 1 is almost-sure winning for the objective φ from ℓ ∈ L if Prα,βℓ (φ) = 1 for all strategies β
for Player 2; and (3) a strategy α for Player 1 is positive winning for the objective φ from ℓ ∈ L if Prα,βℓ (φ) > 0 for
all strategies β for Player 2.
Qualitative analysis of a game consists of the computation of the sure, almost-sure and positive winning sets.
The sure (resp. almost-sure and positive) winning decision problem for an objective consists of a game and a starting
location ℓ, and asks whether there is a sure (resp. almost-sure and positive) winning strategy from ℓ.
3 Partial-observation Stochastic Games
We now recall the usual definition of partial-observation games and their subclasses. We focus on partial-observation
turn-based probabilistic games, where at each round one of the players is in charge of choosing the next action and the
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transition function is probabilistic. We will present a polynomial time reduction of games with probabilistic uncertainty
to these games.
Partial-observation games. A partial-observation stochastic game (for short partial-observation game or simply a
game) is a tuple G = 〈S1 ∪ S2, A1, A2, δ1 ∪ δ2,O1,O2〉 with the following components:
1. (State space). S = S1 ∪ S2 is a finite set of states, where S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ (i.e., S1 and S2 are disjoint), states in S1
are Player 1 states, and states in S2 are Player 2 states.
2. (Actions). Ai (i = 1, 2) is a finite set of actions for Player i.
3. (Transition function). For i ∈ {1, 2}, the probabilistic transition function for Player i is the function δi : Si×Ai →
D(S3−i) that maps a state si ∈ Si and an action ai ∈ Ai to the probability distribution δi(si, ai) over the successor
states in S3−i (i.e., games are alternating).
4. (Observations).O1 ⊆ 2S is a finite set of observations for Player 1 that partitions the state space S, and similarly
O2 is the observations for Player 2. These partitions uniquely define functions obsi : S → Oi, for i ∈ {1, 2}, that
map each state to its observation such that s ∈ obsi(s) for all s ∈ S. We will also consider the special case of
one-sided games, where Player 2 is perfectly informed (has complete observation), i.e., O2 = S, and obs2(s) = s
for all s ∈ S (i.e., the partition consists of singleton states).
Special Class: POMDPs. We will consider one special class of partial-observation games called partial-observable
Markov decision processes (POMDPs), where the action set for Player 2 is a singleton (i.e., there is effectively only
Player 1 and stochastic transitions). Hence we will omit the action set and observation for Player 2 and represent a
POMDP as the following tuple G = 〈S,A, δ,O〉, where δ : S ×A→ D(S).
Plays. In a game, in each turn, for i ∈ {1, 2}, if the current state s is in Si, then Player i chooses an action a ∈ Ai,
and the successor state is chosen by sampling the probability distribution δi(s, a). A play in G is an infinite sequence
of states and actions ρ = s0a0s1a1 . . . such that for all j ≥ 0, if sj ∈ Si, for i ∈ {1, 2}, then aj ∈ Ai such
that δi(sj , aj)(sj+1) > 0. The definitions of prefix and length are analogous to the definitions in Section 2. For
i ∈ {1, 2}, we denote by Prefsi(G) the set of finite prefixes in G that end in a state in Si. The observation sequence
of ρ = s0a0s1a1 . . . for Player i (i = 1, 2) is the unique infinite sequence of observations and actions, i.e., obs(ρ) =
o0a0o1a1o2 . . . such that sj ∈ oj for all j ≥ 0. The observation sequence for finite sequences (prefix of plays) is
defined analogously.
Strategies. A pure strategy in G for Player 1 is a function α : Prefs1(G) → A1. A randomized strategy in G for
Player 1 is a function α : Prefs1(G) → D(A1). A (pure or randomized) strategy α for Player 1 is observation-based
if for all prefixes ρ, ρ′ ∈ Prefs1(G), if obs(ρ) = obs(ρ′), then α(ρ) = α(ρ′). We omit analogous definitions of
strategies for Player 2. We denote by AG, AOG, APG, BG, BOG , BPG the set of all Player-1 strategies in G, the set of all
observation-based Player-1 strategies, the set of all pure Player-1 strategies, the set of all Player-2 strategies in G, the
set of all observation-based Player-2 strategies, and the set of all pure Player-2 strategies, respectively. In the setting
where Player 1 has partial-observation and Player 2 has complete observation, the set BG of all strategies coincides
with the set BOG of all observation-based strategies. We will require the players to play observation-based strategies.
Outcomes. The outcome of two randomized strategies α (for Player 1) and β (for Player 2) from a state s in G
is the set of plays ρ = s0a0s1a1 . . . ∈ Plays(G), with s0 = s, where for all j ≥ 0, if sj ∈ S1 (resp. sj ∈
S2), then α(ρ(j))(aj) > 0 (resp. β(ρ(j))(aj) > 0) and δ1(sj , aj)(sj+1) > 0 (resp. δ2(sj , aj)(sj+1) > 0). This
set is denoted Outcome(G, s, α, β). The outcome of two pure strategies is defined analogously by viewing pure
strategies as randomized strategies that play their chosen action with probability one. The outcome set of the pure
(resp. randomized) strategy α for Player 1 in G is the set Outcome1(G, s, α) of plays ρ such that there exists a pure
(resp. randomized) strategy β for Player 2 with ρ ∈ Outcome(G, s, α, β). The outcome set Outcome2(G, s, β) for
Player 2 is defined symmetrically.
Probability measure. We define the probability measure Prα,βs (·) as follows: for a finite prefix ρ, let Cone(ρ) denote
the set of plays with ρ as prefix. Then we have Prα,βs (Cone(s)) = 1, and for a prefix of length n ending in a Player 1
state sn we have
Prα,βs (Cone(ρansn+1)) = Pr
α,β
s (Cone(ρ)) · α(ρ)(an) · δ1(sn, an)(sn+1);
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and the definition when sn is a Player 2 state is similar. For a set Q of finite prefixes, we write Prα,βs (Cone(Q)) for
Prα,βs (
⋃
ρ∈Q Cone(ρ)).
The winning modes sure, almost-sure, and positive are defined analogously to Section 2, where we restrict the play-
ers to play an observation-based strategy. From the results of [7,2,1,3,6] we obtain the following theorem summarizing
the results for partial-observation games and POMDPs.
Theorem 1 ([7,2,1,3,6]). The following assertions hold:
1. (One-sided games and POMDPs). The sure, almost-sure and positive winning for safety objectives; the sure and
almost-sure winning for reachability objectives and Bu¨chi objectives; the sure and positive winning for coBu¨chi
objectives; and the sure winning for parity objectives are EXPTIME-complete for one-sided partial-observation
games (Player 2 perfectly informed) and POMDPs. The positive winning problem for reachability objectives is
PTIME-complete both for one-sided partial-observation games and POMDPs.
2. (General partial-observation games). The sure, almost-sure winning for safety objectives, the sure winning for
parity objectives are EXPTIME-complete for partial-observation games; the almost-sure winning for reachability
objectives and Bu¨chi objectives, and the positive winning for safety and coBu¨chi objectives are 2EXPTIME-
complete for partial-observation games. The positive winning problem for reachability objectives is EXPTIME-
complete.
3. (Undecidability results). The positive winning problem for Bu¨chi objectives, the almost-sure winning problem for
coBu¨chi objectives, and the positive and almost-sure winning problems for parity objectives are undecidable for
POMDPs.
4 Reduction: Games with Probabilistic Uncertainty to Partial-observation Games
We now present a reduction of games with probabilistic uncertainty to classical partial-observation games. Let G =
(L,ΣI , ΣO, ∆, un) be a game with probabilistic uncertainty and we construct a partial-observation game H = (L ×
L ∪ L × L × ΣI , A1 = ΣI , A2 = ΣO, δ = δ1 ∪ δ2,O1,O2) as follows (below as δ1 and δ2 would be clear from
context, we simply use δ for simplicity):
1. The transition function δ1 is deterministic and for (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ L× L and σI ∈ ΣI we have
δ((ℓ1, ℓ2), σI) = (ℓ1, ℓ2, σI)
2. The transition function δ2 captures both ∆ and un and is defined as follows: for (ℓ1, ℓ2, σI) ∈ L × L × ΣI and
σO ∈ ΣO we have
δ((ℓ1, ℓ2, σI), σO)(ℓ
′
1, ℓ
′
2) = ∆(ℓ1, σI , σO)(ℓ
′
1) · un(ℓ
′
1)(ℓ
′
2).
Intuitively, the first component of the game H keeps track of the real state of the game G, and the second com-
ponent keeps track of the information available from probabilistic uncertainty. Hence Player 1 is only allowed to
observe the second component which is the probability distribution over the observable state given the current
state.
3. The observation mapping is as follows: we have O1 = L; and obs1(ℓ1, ℓ2) = obs1(ℓ1, ℓ2, σI) = ℓ2, i.e., only the
second component is observable. We will consider two cases for O2: for the reduction of all-powerful strategies
we will consider Player 2 has complete-observation, and in the other case we have O2 = L and Player 2 observes
the first component that represents the correct history: i.e., obs2(ℓ1, ℓ2) = obs2(ℓ1, ℓ2, σI) = ℓ1.
4. For a parity objective in G given by priority function pG : L → {0, 1, . . . , d}, we consider the priority function
pH in H as follows: pH((ℓ, ℓ′)) = pH((ℓ, ℓ′, σI)) = pG(ℓ), for all ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ L and σI ∈ ΣI .
Correspondence of strategies. We will now establish the correspondence of probabilistic uncertain strategies in G
and the observation based strategies in H . We present a few notations. For simplicity of presentation, we will use a
slight abuse of notation: given a history (or finite prefix) ρH = s0a0s1a1s2a2 . . . s2n in H we will represent the history
as s0a0a1s2a2a3s3 . . . s2n as the intermediate state is always uniquely defined by the state and the action. Intuitively
this is removing the stuttering and does not affect parity objectives.
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Mapping of strategies from G to H . Given a history ρH = s0a0a1s2a2a3s3 . . . s2n in H , such that s2i = (ℓ12i, ℓ22i),
we consider two histories in G as follows:
g1(ρH) = ℓ
1
0a0a1ℓ
1
2a2a3 . . . ℓ
1
2n; g2(ρH) = ℓ
2
0a0a1ℓ
2
2a2a3 . . . ℓ
2
2n.
Intuitively, g1 gives the first component (which is the correct history) and g2 gives the second component (which is the
observed history). We now define the mapping of strategies from G to H : given strategy αG for Player 1, a strategy
βG for Player 2, and an all-powerful strategy βAG for Player 2, in the game G, we define the corresponding strategies
in H as follows: for a history ρH and an action ai for Player 1 we have
αH(ρH) = αG(g2(ρH));
βH(ρH ai) = βG(g1(ρH) ai);
βCH(ρH ai) = β
A
G(g1(ρH), g2(ρH), ai).
Note that αH and βH are observation-based strategies, and βCH is a strategy with complete-observation, i.e., all-
powerful strategies are mapped to complete-observation strategies. Hence for all-powerful strategies the reduction
is to one-sided games. We will use ĝ to denote the mapping of strategies, i.e., αH = ĝ(αG), βH = ĝ(βG), and
βCH = ĝ(β
A
G).
Mapping of strategies fromH toG. We now present the mapping in the other direction. Let ρ1G = ℓ10σi0σo0ℓ11σi1σo1 . . . ℓ1n,
and ρ2G = ℓ20σi0σo0ℓ21σi1σo1 . . . ℓ2n be two prefixes in G. Intuitively, the first represent the correct history and the second
the observed history. Then we consider the following set of histories in H :
h1(ρ
1
G) = {ρH | g1(ρH) = ρ
1
G}; h2(ρ
2
G) = {ρH | g2(ρH) = ρ
2
G};
and
h12(ρ
1
G, ρ
2
G) = (ℓ
1
0, ℓ
2
0)σ
i
0σ
o
0(ℓ
1
1, ℓ
2
1)σ
i
1σ
o
1 . . . (ℓ
1
n, ℓ
2
n).
We now define the mapping of strategies. Given an observation-based strategy αH ∈ AOH for Player 1, observation-
based strategy βH ∈ BOH for Player 2, and complete observation-based strategy βCH ∈ BH , we define the following
strategies in G: for a correct history ρ1G, observed history ρ2G, and input σi we have
βG(ρ
1
G σ
i) = βH(ρH σ
i); ρH ∈ h1(ρ1G);
αG(ρ
2
G) = αH(ρH); ρH ∈ h2(ρ
2
G);
βAG(ρ
1
G, ρ
2
G, σ
i) = βCH(h12(ρ
1
G, ρ
2
G), σi).
Note that since βH is observation-based it plays the same for all ρH ∈ h1(ρ1G), and similarly, since αH is observation-
based it plays the same for all ρH ∈ h2(ρ2G). Also observe that the strategy βAG is an all-powerful strategy. We will use
ĥ to denote the mapping of strategies, i.e., αG = ĥ(αH), βG = ĥ(βH), and βAG = ĥ(βCH).
Given a starting state ℓ0 ∈ G, consider the following probability distribution µ in H : µ(ℓ0, ℓ) = un(ℓ0)(ℓ). Given
the mapping of strategies, our goal is to establish the equivalences of the probability measure. We introduce some
notations required to establish the equivalence. For j ≥ 0, we denote by (τ1j , τ2j ) the pair of random variables to
denote the j-th Player 1 state of the game H , and by θij and θoj the random variables for the actions following the
j-th state. Our first lemma establishes a connection of the probability of observing the second component in H given
the first component along with function ObsSeq. We introduce notations to define two events: given two prefixes
ρ1G = ℓ
1
0σ
i
0σ
o
0ℓ
1
1σ
i
1σ
o
1 . . . ℓ
1
n, and ρ2G = ℓ20σi0σo0ℓ21σi1σo1 . . . ℓ2n in G, let E1,2(ρ1G, ρ2G) denote the event that for all
0 ≤ j ≤ n we have τ1j = ℓ1j , τ2j = ℓ2j and for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n − 1 we have θij = σij , θoj = σoj ; and E1(ρ1G) denote the
event that for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n we have τ1j = ℓ1j and for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n− 1 we have θij = σij , θoj = σoj .
Lemma 1. Let ρ1G = ℓ10σi0σo0ℓ11σi1σo1 . . . ℓ1n, and ρ2G = ℓ20σi0σo0ℓ21σi1σo1 . . . ℓ2n be two prefixes in G. Then for all strate-
gies αH and βH , the probability that the second component sequence in H is ρ2G, given the first component sequence
is ρ1G is ObsSeq(ρ1G)(ρ2G), i.e., formally
PrαH ,βHµ (E1,2(ρ
1
G, ρ
2
G) | E1(ρ
1
G)) = ObsSeq(ρ
1
G)(ρ
2
G).
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Proof. The proof is by induction on the length of the prefixes. The base case is as follows: let the length of prefixes
ρ1G and ρ2G be 1, with ρ1G = ℓ0 and ρ2G = ℓ. Then we have
ObsSeq(ℓ0)(ℓ) = µ(ℓ0, ℓ);
as required. We now consider the inductive case: we consider prefixes ρ1Gσinσonℓ1n+1 and ρ2Gσinσonℓ2n+1. Let us consider
the events E1n+1 = E1,2(ρ1Gσinσonℓ1n+1, ρ2Gσinσonℓ2n+1) and E2n+1 = E1(ρ1Gσinσonℓ1n+1). Let E
1
n+1 denote the event that
τ1n = ℓ
1
n, τ
2
n = ℓ
2
n, τ
1
n+1 = ℓ
1
n+1, τ
2
n+1 = ℓ
2
n+1, θ
1
n = σ
i
n, and θ2n = σon; and E
2
n+1 denote the event that τ1n = ℓ1n,
τ1n+1 = ℓ
1
n+1, θ
1
n = σ
i
n, and θ2n = σon. Then by definition we have
PrαH ,βHµ (E
1
n+1 | E
2
n+1) =
δ((ℓ1n, ℓ
2
n, σ
i
n), σ
o
n)(ℓ
1
n+1, ℓ
2
n+1)∑
ℓ˜2
n
,ℓ˜2
n+1
δ((ℓ1n, ℓ˜
2
n, σ
i
n), σ
o
n)(ℓ
1
n+1, ℓ˜
2
n+1)
(In the numerator all choices are fixed, and
in denominator are all possible choices of the second component)
=
∆(ℓ1n, σ
i
n, σ
o
n)(ℓ
1
n+1) · un(ℓ
1
n+1)(ℓ
2
n+1)
∆(ℓ1n, σ
i
n, σ
o
n)(ℓ
1
n+1) ·
∑
ℓ˜2
n+1
un(ℓ1n+1)(ℓ˜
2
n+1)
= un(ℓ1n+1)(ℓ
2
n+1) (Since
∑
ℓ˜2
n+1
un(ℓ1n+1)(ℓ˜
2
n+1) = 1)
Note that the crucial fact used in the above proof is in the second equality and the fact is that for all ℓ˜2n we have
δ((ℓ1n, ℓ˜
2
n, σ
i
n), σ
o
n)(ℓ
1
n+1, ℓ˜
2
n+1) = ∆(ℓ
1
n, σ
i
n, σ
o
n)(ℓn+1) · un(ℓn+1)(ℓ˜
2
n+1) (i.e., it is independent of ℓ˜2n). Hence using
the above equality and inductive hypothesis we have:
PrαH ,βHµ (E
1
n+1 | E
2
n+1) = Pr
αH ,βH
µ (E1,2(ρ
1
G, ρ
2
G) | E1(ρ
1
G)) · Pr
αH ,βH
µ (E
1
n+1 | E
2
n+1)
= ObsSeq(ρ1G)(ρ
2
G) · Pr
αH ,βH
µ (E
1
n+1 | E
2
n+1) (By inductive hypothesis)
= ObsSeq(ρ1G)(ρ
2
G) · un(ℓ
1
n+1)(ℓ
2
n+1) (By previous equality)
= ObsSeq(ρ1Gσ
i
nσ
o
nℓ
1
n+1)(ρ
2
Gσ
i
nσ
o
nℓ
2
n+1)
The desired result follows.
We will now establish the equivalences of the probabilities of the cones.
Lemma 2. For all finite prefixes ρ1G in G, the following assertions hold:
1. For all strategies αG, βG, βAG (all-powerful), we have
PrαG,βGℓ0 (Cone(ρ
1
G)) = Pr
ĝ(αG),ĝ(βG)
µ (Cone(h1(ρ
1
G))); Pr
αG,β
A
G
ℓ0
(Cone(ρ1G)) = Pr
ĝ(αG),ĝ(β
A
G
)
µ (Cone(h1(ρ
1
G))).
2. For all strategies αH , βH , βCH (complete-observation), we have
Pr
ĥ(αH),ĥ(βH)
ℓ0
(Cone(ρ1G)) = Pr
αH ,βH
µ (Cone(h1(ρ
1
G))); Pr
ĥ(αH),ĥ(β
C
H
)
ℓ0
(Cone(ρ1G)) = Pr
αH ,β
C
H
µ (Cone(h1(ρ
1
G))).
Proof. We will present the result for the first item, and the proof for second item is identical. Let us denote by
αH = ĝ(αG) and βH = ĝ(βG). We will prove the result by induction on the length of the prefixes. The base case
is as follows: let the length of the prefix ρ1G be 1, with ρ1G = ℓ0. We observe that Pr
αG,βG
ℓ0
(Cone(ℓ0)) = 1, and
PrαH ,βHµ (Cone(h1(ℓ0))) = 1, and for all other cones of length 1 the probability is zero. This completes the base case.
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We now consider the inductive case: by inductive hypothesis we assume that PrαG,βGℓ0 (Cone(ρ
1
G)) =
PrαH ,βHµ (Cone(h1(ρ
1
G))); and show that
PrαG,βGℓ0 (Cone(ρ
1
Ganbnℓn+1)) = Pr
αH ,βH
µ (Cone(h1(ρ
1
Ganbnℓn+1))).
Let ℓn be the last state of ρ1G. We first consider the left-hand side (LHS):
Pr αG,βGℓ0 (Cone(ρ
1
Ganbnℓn+1))
= PrαG,βGℓ0 (Cone(ρ
1
G)) ·
( ∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρ1
G
)
ObsSeq(ρ1G)(ρ
′) · αG(ρ
′)(an) · βG(ρ
1
Gan)(bn) ·∆(ℓn, an, bn)(ℓn+1)
)
= PrαH ,βHµ (Cone(h1(ρ
1
G))) ·
( ∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρ1
G
)
ObsSeq(ρ1G)(ρ
′) · αG(ρ
′)(an) · βG(ρ
1
Gan)(bn) ·∆(ℓn, an, bn)(ℓn+1)
)
=
∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρ1
G
)
PrαH ,βHµ (Cone(h12(ρ
1
G, ρ
′))) · αG(ρ
′)(an) · βG(ρ
1
Gan)(bn) ·∆(ℓn, an, bn)(ℓn+1)
Above the first equality is by definition, the second equality by inductive hypothesis, and the last equality is obtained
from Lemma 1 as follows: by Lemma 1 we have ObsSeq(ρ1G)(ρ′) = Pr
αH ,βH
µ (E1,2(ρ
1
G, ρ
′) | E1(ρ1G)), and hence
PrαH ,βHµ (Cone(h1(ρ
1
G)))·
∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρ1
G
)
ObsSeq(ρ1G)(ρ
′)
=
∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρ1
G
)
PrαH ,βHµ (Cone(h1(ρ
1
G))) · Pr
αH ,βH
µ (E1,2(ρ
1
G, ρ
′) | E1(ρ
1
G))
=
∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρ1
G
)
PrαH ,βHµ (Cone(h12(ρ
1
G, ρ
′))).
We now consider the right-hand side (RHS) PrαH ,βHµ (Cone(h1(ρ1Ganbnℓn+1))) and the RHS can be expanded as:
(below for brevity we write ρ̂ = h12(ρ1G, ρ′))∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρ1
G
)
∑
ℓ′
n+1
PrαH ,βHµ (Cone(ρ̂)) · αH(ρ̂)(an) · βH(ρ̂an)(bn) · δ((ℓn, ℓ
′
n, an), bn)(ℓn+1, ℓ
′
n+1)
Since we have
αH(h12(ρ
1
G, ρ
′))(an) = αG(ρ
′)(an); and βH(h12(ρ1G, ρ′)an)(bn) = βG(ρ1Gan)(bn),
the above expression for RHS is equivalently described as:∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρ1
G
)
∑
ℓ′
n+1
PrαH ,βHµ (Cone(h12(ρ
1
G, ρ
′))) · αG(ρ
′)(an) · βG(ρ
1
Gan)(bn) ·∆(ℓn, an, bn)(ℓn+1) · un(ℓn+1)(ℓ
′
n+1)
Since
∑
ℓ′
n+1
un(ℓn+1)(ℓ
′
n+1) = 1, it follows that LHS is equal to the RHS. The result for correspondence for all-
powerful strategy βAG is essentially copy-paste of the above proof replacing appropriately βG by βAG . This completes
the proof and the desired result follows.
It follows that there is a sure, almost-sure, positive winning strategy in G for Parity(pG) iff there is a corresponding
one in H for Parity(pH) and hence from Theorem 1 we obtain the following result.
Theorem 2. The following assertions hold:
1. (All-powerful Player 2). The sure, almost-sure and positive winning for safety objectives; the sure and almost-sure
winning for reachability objectives and Bu¨chi objectives; the sure and positive winning for coBu¨chi objectives;
and the sure winning for parity objectives can be solved in EXPTIME for games with probabilistic uncertainty
with all-powerful strategies for Player 2. The positive winning for reachability objectives can be solved in PTIME.
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2. (Not all-powerful Player 2). The sure, almost-sure winning for safety objectives; and the sure winning for parity
objectives can be solved in EXPTIME; the almost-sure winning for reachability objectives and Bu¨chi objectives;
the positive winning for safety and coBu¨chi objectives can be solved in 2EXPTIME for games with probabilistic
uncertainty without all-powerful strategies for Player 2. The positive winning for reachability objectives can be
solved in EXPTIME.
5 Reduction: POMDPs to Games with Probabilistic Uncertainty
In this section we present a reduction in the reverse direction and show that POMDPs with parity objectives can be
reduced to games with probabilistic uncertainty and parity objectives. We first present the reduction and then show
the correctness of the reduction by mapping prefixes, strategies, and establishing the equivalence of the probability
measure.
Reduction: POMDPs to games with probabilistic uncertainty. Let H = (S,A, δ,O) be a POMDP with a parity
objective φ, we construct the game of probabilistic uncertainty G = (L,ΣI , ΣO, ∆, un) as follows:
– L = S;
– ΣI = A;
– ΣO = {⊥};
– For ℓ ∈ L and a ∈ ΣI let∆(ℓ, a,⊥)(ℓ′) = δ(ℓ, a)(ℓ′), i.e., the transition function is same as the transition function
of the POMDP. In other words, the state space is the same, the action choices of the POMDP corresponds to the
input action choice, and the output action set is singleton, and the transition function mimics the transition function
of the POMDP. Below we use the probabilistic uncertainty to capture the partial-observation of the POMDP.
– The uncertainty function is as follows: un(ℓ)(ℓ′) =
{
0 if obs(ℓ) 6= obs(ℓ′)
1
|obs(ℓ)| if obs(ℓ) = obs(ℓ
′)
The parity objective is the same as the original parity objective.
Mapping of prefixes. Given a prefix (or a finite history) ρH = s0a0s1a1s2 . . . sn in H we construct a prefix in G as
ρG = s0a0⊥s1a1⊥s2 . . . sn by simply inserting the ⊥ actions. This construction defines a bijection h : PrefsH →
PrefsG between prefixes. We can naturally extend the mapping to sets of prefixes. Let Ψ ⊆ PrefsH , then h′(Ψ) =
{h(ρ) | ρ ∈ Ψ}.
Lemma 3. For prefixes ρ, ρ′ in G the following assertion holds:
ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ′) =


1∏n
i=1 |oi|
If obs(h−1(ρ)) = obs(h−1(ρ′)) = o1a1o2 . . . an−1on
0 Otherwise
Proof. We prove the result by induction on the length of prefixes. We will only consider ρ and ρ′ that have the same
length, as otherwise by definition the observation sequence probability is 0. We first consider the base case.
Base case. Let ℓ0 be the initial state. Then ρ = ℓ0 and let ρ′ = ℓ for some ℓ ∈ L. Then:
ObsSeq(ℓ0, ℓ) = un(ℓ0, ℓ) =
1
|obs(ℓ0)|
if ℓ0 and ℓ have the same observation and 0 otherwise. This proves the base case.
Inductive step. We now consider prefixes of length n+ 1, and by inductive hypothesis the result holds for prefixes of
length n. Then
ObsSeq(ρan⊥ℓn+1)(ρ
′an⊥ℓ
′
n+1) = ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ
′) · un(ℓn+1)(ℓ
′
n+1).
We now consider two cases to complete the proof.
– If obs(h−1(ρan⊥ℓn+1)) 6= obs(h−1(ρ′an⊥ℓ′n+1)), then either obs(h−1(ρ)) 6= obs(h−1(ρ′)) or obs(ℓn+1) 6=
obs(ℓ′n+1). It follows that one of the factors (ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ′) or un(ℓn+1)(ℓ′n+1)) is equal to 0 and hence:
ObsSeq(ρan⊥ℓn+1)(ρ
′an⊥ℓ
′
n+1) = 0
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– Otherwise, we have obs(h−1(ρan⊥ℓn+1)) = obs(h−1(ρ′an⊥ℓ′n+1)) = o1a1o2 . . . an−1onanon+1. Then:
ObsSeq(ρan⊥ℓn+1)(ρ
′an⊥ℓ
′
n+1) = ObsSeq(ρ)(ρ
′) · un(ℓn+1)(ℓ
′
n+1) =
1∏n
i=1 |oi|
·
1
|on+1|
=
1∏n+1
i=1 |oi|
The desired result follows.
Mapping of strategies. We first present the mapping of strategies from H to G and then from G to H . Note that in
the game G, there is no choice for Player 2, and hence we remove the Player 2 strategies in the descriptions below.
Mapping strategies from H to G. Let αH be an observation-based Player-1 strategy in H and ρG =
s0a0⊥s1a1⊥s2 . . . sn be a prefix in G. We define a Player-1 strategy αG in G as follows: αG(ρG) = αH(h−1(ρG)).
Mapping strategies from G to H . Let αG be a Player-1 strategy in G and ρH = s0a0s1a1s2 . . . sn be a prefix in H with
o = o0a0o1a1o2 . . . on as its observation sequence. Note that as Player 2 has only one strategy (always playing ⊥)
we omit it from discussion. Note that every ρ ∈ ActMt(h(ρH)) can have different actions with different probabilities
enabled. We define a Player-1 strategy αH in H as follows: for an action a ∈ A we have
αH(ρH)(a) =
∑
ρ′∈ActMt(h(ρH))
ObsSeq(h(ρH))(ρ
′) · αG(ρ
′)(a).
We now show that the strategy αH is an observation-based strategy for Player 1 in the POMDP.
Lemma 4. The strategy αH obtained from strategy αG is an observation-based strategy for Player 1 in H .
Proof. Let ρH and ρ′H be two prefixes in H that match in observation sequence and we need to argue that αH plays
the same for both prefixes ρH and ρ′H . Observe that since ρH and ρ′H has the same observation sequence, we have
ActMt(h(ρH)) = ActMt(h(ρ
′
H)). Moreover it follows from Lemma 3 that ObsSeq(h(ρH)) only depends on the
observation sequence of ρH and hence for all ρ′ ∈ ActMt(h(ρH)) = ActMt(h(ρ′H)) we have ObsSeq(h(ρH))(ρ′) =
ObsSeq(h(ρ′H))(ρ
′). It follows that for all actions a ∈ A we have αH(ρH)(a) = αH(ρ′H)(a). It follows that αH is
observation based.
Correspondence of probabilities. In the following two lemmas we establish the correspondence of the probabilities
for the mappings.
Lemma 5. Let us consider the mapping of strategies from H to G. For all prefixes ρH in H we have
PrαHµ (Cone(ρH)) = Pr
αG
ℓ0
(Cone(h(ρH))).
Proof. The proof is based on induction on the length of the prefix ρH . We denote the last state of ρH by ℓn.
Base case. For prefixes of length 1 where ρH = ℓ0 we get PrαHµ (Cone(ℓ0)) = 1 and PrαGl0 (Cone(h(ℓ0))) = 1. For all
other prefixes both sides are equal to 0. Hence the base case follows.
Inductive step. By inductive hypothesis we assume the result for prefixes ρH of length n (i.e., we assume that
PrαHµ (Cone(ρH)) = Pr
αG
ℓ0
(Cone(h(ρH)))) and will show that
PrαHµ (Cone(ρHanℓn+1)) = Pr
αG
ℓ0
(Cone(h(ρHanℓn+1))).
First we expand the left hand side (LHS) and by definition we get that:
PrαHµ (Cone(ρHanℓn+1)) = Pr
αH
µ (Cone(ρH)) · αH(ρH)(an) · δ(ℓn, an)(ℓn+1).
We now expand the right hand side (RHS) and get that:
PrαGℓ0 (Cone(h(ρHanℓn+1))) =
PrαGℓ0 (Cone(h(ρH))) ·

 ∑
ρ′∈ActMt(h(ρH ))
ObsSeq(h(ρH))(ρ
′) · αG(ρ
′)(an) ·∆(ℓn, an,⊥)(ℓn+1)


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Using the inductive hypothesis, the definition of the game, and the mapping of strategies we get on the RHS:
PrαGℓ0 (Cone(h(ρHanℓn+1))) =
PrαHµ (Cone(ρH)) ·

 ∑
ρ′∈ActMt(h(ρH))
ObsSeq(h(ρH))(ρ
′) · αH(h
−1(ρ′))(an) · δ(ℓn, an)(ℓn+1)


For all ρ′ that do not match the observation sequence of h(ρH), we have ObsSeq(h(ρH))(ρ′) = 0 (by Lemma 3), and
as αH is observation based for all ρ′ ∈ ActMt(ρH) that matches the observation sequence of h(ρH), the strategy αH
plays the same. Let us denote by ρ′ ≈ h(ρH) that ρ′ matches the observation sequence of h(ρH). Then we have∑
ρ′∈ActMt(h(ρH))
ObsSeq(h(ρH))(ρ
′)· αH(h−1(ρ′))(an)
=
∑
ρ′∈ActMt(h(ρH )),ρ′≈h(ρH )
ObsSeq(h(ρH))(ρ
′) · αH(h
−1(ρ′))(an)
=
∑
ρ′∈ActMt(h(ρH )),ρ′≈h(ρH )
ObsSeq(h(ρH))(ρ
′) · αH(ρH)(an)
= αH(ρH)(an);
where the first equality follows as for all sequences ρ′ that do not match the observation sequence of h(ρH) we
have ObsSeq(h(ρH))(ρ′) = 0; the second equality follows as for all ρ′ ≈ h(ρH) we have αH(h−1(ρ′))(an) =
αH(ρH)(an) (asαH is observation based); and the last equality follows because as ObsSeq is a probability distribution
we have
∑
ρ′∈ActMt(h(ρH)),ρ′≈h(ρH)
ObsSeq(h(ρH))(ρ
′) = 1. Hence we have
PrαGℓ0 (Cone(h(ρHanℓn+1))) = Pr
αH
µ (Cone(ρH)) · αH(ρH)(an) · δ(ℓn, an)(ℓn+1)
Thus we have that LHS and RHS coincide and this completes the proof.
Lemma 6. Let us consider the mapping of strategies from G to H . For all prefixes ρG in G we have
PrαHµ (Cone(h
−1(ρG))) = Pr
αG
ℓ0
(Cone(ρG))
Proof. The inductive proof is as follows and we will denote the last state of ρG as ℓn. The base case is similar to the
base case of Lemma 5. We now present the inductive case.
Inductive step. By inductive hypothesis we assume the result for prefixes ρG of length n (i.e., we assume that
PrαHµ (Cone(h
−1(ρG))) = Pr
αG
ℓ0
(Cone(ρG))) and will show that
PrαHµ (Cone(h
−1(ρGanℓn+1))) = Pr
αG
ℓ0
(Cone(ρGanℓn+1)).
First we expand the right hand side (RHS) and by definition we get that:
PrαGℓ0 (Cone(ρGanℓn+1)) = Pr
αG
ℓ0
(Cone(ρG)) ·

 ∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρG)
ObsSeq(ρG)(ρ
′) · αG(ρ
′)(an) ·∆(ℓn, an,⊥)(ℓn+1)


As ∆(ℓn, an,⊥)(ℓn+1) does not depend on ρ′ we get:
PrαGℓ0 (Cone(ρGanℓn+1)) = Pr
αG
ℓ0
(Cone(ρG)) ·∆(ℓn, an,⊥)(ℓn+1) ·

 ∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρG)
ObsSeq(ρG)(ρ
′) · αG(ρ
′)(an)


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We will now show that the expansion of the left hand side (LHS) also gives the same expression. Let ρH = h−1(ρG).
By expanding the LHS we get:
PrαHµ (Cone(h
−1(ρGanℓn+1))) = Pr
αH
µ (Cone(h
−1(ρG))) · αH(h−1(ρG))(an) · δ(ℓn, an)(ℓn+1)
= PrαHµ (Cone(ρH)) · αH(ρH)(an) · δ(ℓn, an)(ℓn+1)
= PrαHµ (Cone(ρH)) · αH(ρH)(an) ·∆(ℓn, an,⊥)(ℓn+1)
= PrαGℓ0 (Cone(ρG)) · αH(ρH)(an) ·∆(ℓn, an,⊥)(ℓn+1);
where the first equality is by definition; the second equality is by simply re-writing h−1(ρG) as ρH ; the third equality
is by the definition of ∆ and δ; and the final equality is the inductive hypothesis. By definition of αH we have
αH(ρH)(an) =
(∑
ρ′∈ActMt(ρG)
ObsSeq(ρG)(ρ
′) · αG(ρ′)(an)
)
; and hence it follows that LHS and RHS coincide.
Thus the desired result follows.
The previous two lemmas establish the equivalence of the probability measure and completes the reduction of
POMDPs to games with probabilistic uncertainty. Hence the lower bounds for POMDPs also gives us the lower bound
for games with probabilistic uncertainty. Hence Theorem 2, along with the reduction from POMDPs and Theorem 1
gives us the following result for games with probabilistic uncertainty (the results are also summarized in Table 1).
Theorem 3. The following assertions hold:
1. (All-powerful Player 2). The sure, almost-sure and positive winning for safety objectives; the sure and almost-sure
winning for reachability objectives and Bu¨chi objectives; the sure and positive winning for coBu¨chi objectives;
and the sure winning for parity objectives are all EXPTIME-complete for games with probabilistic uncertainty
with all-powerful strategies for Player 2. The positive winning for reachability objectives is PTIME-complete.
2. (Not all-powerful Player 2). The sure, almost-sure winning for safety objectives; and the sure winning for parity
objectives are all EXPTIME-complete; the almost-sure winning for reachability objectives and Bu¨chi objectives;
the positive winning for safety and coBu¨chi objectives can be solved in 2EXPTIME and is EXPTIME-hard for
games with probabilistic uncertainty without all-powerful strategies for Player 2. The positive winning for reach-
ability objectives can be solved in EXPTIME.
3. (Undecidability results). The positive winning problem for Bu¨chi objectives, the almost-sure winning problem for
coBu¨chi objectives, and the positive and almost-sure winning problem for parity objectives are undecidable for
games with probabilistic uncertainty.
Sure Almost Positive
All-powerful Not-all-powerful All-powerful Not-all-powerful All-powerful Not-all-powerful
Safety EXP-complete EXP-complete EXP-complete EXP-complete EXP-complete 2EXP, EXP
Reachability EXP-complete EXP-complete EXP-complete 2EXP, EXP PTIME-complete EXP, PTIME
Bu¨chi EXP-complete EXP-complete EXP-complete 2EXP, EXP Undec. Undec.
coBu¨chi EXP-complete EXP-complete Undec. Undec. EXP-complete 2EXP, EXP
Parity EXP-complete EXP-complete Undec. Undec. Undec. Undec.
Table 1. Complexity of games with probabilistic uncertainty with parity objectives, where for each entry we present
the upper and lower bound, or undecidability.
6 Conclusion
In this work we considered games with probabilistic uncertainty, which is natural for many problems, and has not
been considered before. We present a reduction of such games to classical partial-observation games and a reduction
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of POMDPs to games with probabilistic uncertainty. As a consequence we establish the precise decidability frontier
for games with probabilistic uncertainty. Table 1 summarizes our results. For most problems we establish EXPTIME-
complete bounds. For some decidable problems we establish 2EXPTIME upper bounds, and EXPTIME lower bounds,
and establishing the precise complexity results are interesting open problems.
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